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From Feres v. United States to Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.: An Examination of Supreme
Court Jurisprudence and a Couple of Suggestions
David E. Seidelson*
Sometimes an appellate court opinion so illuminates an area of
law that its language seems to memorialize intellectual concepts
already perceived, though not yet verbalized, by the reader. This
kind of opinion tends to elicit a reader response of, "Yes, that's it!
That's exactly right!" and provides lower courts with lucid prece-
dent and persuasive rationales that facilitate decisions in future
cases. At other times, appellate court opinions seem to do little
more than offer a legal conclusion that seized the court, or a major-
ity of its members, without any clear rationale for that conclusion.
This kind of opinion tends to elicit a reader reaction of, "Huh?
That can't be right!" and provides lower courts with more confu-
sion than guidance in applying the decision to future cases with
varying fact patterns. The Supreme Court opinions dealing with
the applicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA" or
"Act")1 to injuries incident to military service, and with the crea-
tion and applicability of the government contractor defense2 have,
unfortunately, fallen within the second category of "That can't be
right!"
Feres AND ITS PROGENY
In Feres v. United States,s the United States Supreme Court
was required to determine whether Congress, in enacting the
FTCA and its partial waiver of sovereign immunity, intended the
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1988).
2. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See notes 237-264
and accompanying text.
3. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The author has written before on the Feres issue. See David
E. Seidelson, The Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight Into an
Old Problem, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1983). However, the intervening opinions of the Su-
preme Court require reexamination of Feres, and, in this author's opinion, different conclu-
sions concerning the issue.
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Act to apply to injuries incident to military service. Three cases
were consolidated for decision by the Feres Court. In one, the de-
cedent, an active duty soldier, died in a fire in an Army barracks.4
The plaintiff alleged that the Army had negligently "quarter[ed]
him in barracks known or which should have been known to be
unsafe because of a defective heating plant, and in failing to main-
tain an adequate fire watch." 5 In the second case, the plaintiff, who
was in the Army, underwent a stomach operation. During the
course of another operation approximately eight months later, and
after the plaintiff's discharge, surgeons removed a towel "marked
'Medical Department U.S. Army,' ",7 from the plaintiff's stomach.
The plaintiff alleged that the Army surgeon had negligently left
the towel in his stomach during the first operation." In the final
case, the decedent's executrix alleged that the decedent's death
was caused by "negligent and unskillful medical treatment by
army surgeons." 9
The Court candidly conceded the difficulty in determining if the
FTCA was intended to apply to injuries incident to military
service:
There are few guiding materials for our task of statutory construction. No
committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the statute was
designed to have on the problem before us, or that it even was in mind.
Under these circumstances, no conclusion can be above challenge, but if we
misinterpret the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy.'0
Moreover, the Court did "not overlook considerations persuasive of
liability in [the] cases" before it." The FTCA, in defining employ-
ees of the government for respondeat superior purposes, includes
"members of the military or naval forces of the United States." 2
The FTCA explicitly excludes from coverage "any claim arising out
of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces. . . dur-
ing time of war"'3 and "any claim arising in a foreign country.""
Reading these three provisions, one might infer that the FTCA was





9. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
10. Id. at 138.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
13. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)).
14. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)).
220 Vol. 32:219
An Examination of Feres
intended to apply to injuries incident to military service where
such injuries were the result of negligence on the part of military
personnel, if the injuries were noncombatant and occurred within
the United States. The Court, however, rejected this inference. In-
stead, it concluded that the FTCA was not applicable to injuries
which "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service. ,15
The Court offered a half dozen reasons in support of its conclu-
sion in Feres. First, it noted that the Act subjects the government
to liability "in the same manner and to the same extent as a pri-
vate individual under like circumstances.' 6 In the Court's view,
there existed no body of law applicable or analogous to the rela-
tionship between the military victims and the government in the
cases before the Court. Did the Court not forget that two of the
three cases before it were medical malpractice actions, and that the
third was similar to a landlord-tenant action? It recognized the ap-
parent similarities, stating, "[iun the usual civilian doctor and pa-
tient relationship, there is of course a liability for malpractice. And
a landlord would undoubtedly be held liable if an injury occurred
to a tenant as the result of a negligently maintained heating
plant."1
If these comparisons are true, then why was there no applicable
or analogous body of law to apply for the plaintiffs in Feres? To
the Court, "the liability assumed by the Government [under the
FTCA was] that created by 'all the circumstances,' not that which
a few of the circumstances might create."' 8 Surely the Court's con-
clusion is overbroad. If a mail truck carrying first-class mail ran a
red light and broadsided an automobile operated by a civilian,
then the victim would have an FTCA action against the govern-
ment pursuant to the law of the state where the truck driver's neg-
ligence occurred. The fact that carrying first-class mail is an activ-
ity prohibited to any private entity would have no effect on the
injured party's ability to sue under the FTCA.
The second reason offered by the Court to support its conclusion
is that the Act provides that the government's liability is to be de-
termined pursuant to "the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion [of the government employee] occurred."' 9 The Court found it
15. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
16. Id. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
17. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
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illogical that the location in which an injury occurred should be
determinative when the claimant has no choice but to go where the
government wishes. 20 The Court apparently concluded that it
would be unfair to the soldier to have the FTCA applied to his
injuries incident to military service. The soldier's reaction to that
solicitude would probably be, "Thanks, but no thanks." To the sol-
dier, application of any state's law would be preferable to the con-
clusion achieved by the Court, that the soldier has no cause of ac-
tion at all in tort.
Another problem with the Court's rationale is the assumption
that if the FTCA were deemed applicable, it would invariably be
the law of the state where the soldier was injured that would gov-
ern the decision in the case. This simply is not correct. The Act
requires the application of the law of the state where the govern-
ment negligence occurred, which may or may not be the state
where the soldier is ultimately injured. A negligent act or decision
in one state could result in injuries to soldiers in several states.2 1
The Court's third rationale is that "most states have abolished
the common-law action for damages between employer and em-
ployee and superseded it with workmen's compensation statutes
which provide, in most instances, the sole basis of liability. ' 2' The
implication is that if state law were applied to injuries incident to
military service, as would be mandated by the FTCA, no tort ac-
tion would result. The problem with this implication is that the
typical state bar to negligence actions arising out of work-con-
nected injuries is the result of an exclusivity clause provided in the
workers' compensation statute.23 There is no similar exclusivity
20. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43. The Court believed:
This perhaps is fair enough when the claimant is not on duty or is free to choose his own
habitat and thereby limit the jurisdiction in which it will be possible for federal activities to
cause him injury. That his tort claims should be governed by the law of the location where
he has elected to be is just as fair when the defendant is the Government as when the
defendant is a private individual. But a soldier on active duty has no such choice and must
serve any place or, under modern conditions, any number of places in quick succession in
the forty-eight states, the Canal Zone, or Alaska, or Hawaii, or any other territory of the
United States. That the geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his
tort claims makes no sense.
Id.
21. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (holding that the FTCA's refer-
ence to the law of the state where the governmental negligence occurred was a reference to
the total law of that state, conflicts law as well as local law, so that any choice-of-law prob-
lem was required to be resolved pursuant to the conflicts law of that state).
22. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
23. ARTHUR LARSON, 2A LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 65.00 at 12-1 (1992).
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clause in the Veterans' Benefits Act ("VBA"), s4 which is the rough
analogue for injuries incident to military service. In addition, the
Court noted that:
[wihere [state workers' compensation] statutes are inapplicable, states have
differing provisions as to limitations of liability and different doctrines as to
assumption of risk, fellow-servant rules and contributory or comparative
negligence. It would hardly be a rational plan of providing for those dis-
abled in service by others in service to leave them dependent upon geo-
graphic considerations over which they have no control and to laws which
fluctuate in existence and value.2
5
The above language again suggests that the Court was motivated
by a concern for fairness to the soldier in holding the FTCA inap-
plicable to injuries incident to military service. Once more, the Sol-
dier's reaction would probably be, "Thanks, but no thanks."
In its fourth line of reasoning in Feres, the Court characterized
the "relationship between the Government and members of its
armed forces [as] 'distinctively federal in character,' "20 and then
concluded that Congress could not have intended to subject that
relationship to the laws of the various states, as provided in the
FTCA.2 The Court's fourth rationale has several problems. The
relationship between any federal employee and the government is
always distinctively federal, in the sense that it is likely to be gov-
erned by a host of federal laws, regulations, and rules. If the fed-
eral character of the relationship precluded the application of state
law, the FTCA would be nearly nugatory since the Act can apply
only to negligence on the part of a government employee acting
within the scope of his employment. Of course, in the three cases
before the Court, a distinctively federal relationship existed not
only as between alleged tortfeasor and government, but also be-
tween victim and government. Assuming it was that dual-level, dis-
tinctively federal relationship that the Court contemplated, does it
justify the Court's conclusion that the FTCA could not have been
intended to apply? The Court's conclusion can be tested by posing
a simple hypothetical case.
Suppose a soldier driving a jeep while on active military duty
runs a red light and strikes a civilian government employee who is
crossing the street on his way to lunch. Would the injured victim
have an FTCA action against the government? It appears the an-
24. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1988).
25. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
26. Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).
27. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
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swer is yes.2" If the injured civilian has an FTCA action against the
government, then the dual-level relationship between government
and victim and government and tortfeasor would not alone seem to
justify the Court's conclusion in the Feres case. The Court was,
however, contemplating a dual-level federal relationship between
victim/soldier and tortfeasor/soldier. Does that justify the conclu-
sion it reaches, that Congress could not have intended the govern-
ment's liability to be determined by state law? Unless the act or
omission of the tortfeasor/soldier was uniquely military in nature,
the application of state law as provided by the Act would be ap-
propriate.29 In the three cases before the Court, however, the al-
leged negligence, which consisted of medical malpractice in two
and negligent maintenance of a furnace in one, hardly implicated
any act or omission uniquely military in nature.
In the fifth rationale provided by the Court in Feres, it noted
that the VBA provides "compensation for injuries or death of
those in armed services" which has "some bearing" on whether the
FTCA was intended to apply to such injuries.30 As the Court
noted:
We might say that the claimant may (a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b)
elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the other, or (c) pursue both, credit-
ing the larger liability with the proceeds of the smaller, or (d) that the com-
pensation and pension remedy excludes the tort remedy. There is as much
statutory authority for one as for another of these conclusions. If Congress
had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply in cases of this
kind, it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any provision to adjust
these two types of remedy to each other. The absence of any such adjust-
ment is persuasive that there was no awareness that the Act might be inter-
preted to permit recovery for injuries incident to military service."
The problem with this fifth rationale is two-fold. As the Court it-
self noted in alternative (c) above, the victim could pursue both
remedies, crediting the larger liability with the smaller. The second
problem is that the Court itself approved of this method of "ad-
justment" four years after Feres was decided, even absent explicit
congressional authority.32
28. It is assumed that because the civilian employee was on his way to lunch, his
injury would be deemed not to be work-connected, thus making the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1988), inapplicable.
29. In these circumstances, one could argue that there is no applicable or analogous
state law.
30. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
31. Id.
32. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See notes 120-31 and accompa-
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Finally, in the last rationale offered by the Feres Court, it again
evidenced solicitude for the poor soldier who "is at a peculiar dis-
advantage in litigation. Lack of time and money, the difficulty if
not impossibility of procuring witnesses, are only a few of the fac-
tors working to his disadvantage. ' 33 To spare the soldier those dis-
advantages, the Court concluded that Congress had not intended
the Act to apply to injuries incident to military service." Once
again, the soldier's reaction would probably be, "Thanks, but no
thanks." An FTCA action, even with the enumerated difficulties,
would seem preferable to no FTCA action at all. Moreover, the dif-
ficulties outlined by the Court may not be quite as formidable as
the language implies. If the Act were deemed applicable, the vic-
tim/soldier (or, in the event of his death, the personal representa-
tive of his estate) would have no great difficulty in finding counsel
willing to take the case on a contingent fee basis. It would then be
counsel, not victim, who would assume the principal burden of pro-
curing witnesses and preparing the case for trial.
In summary, it seems that the medley of rationales offered by
the Court in Feres do not, either singly or in combination, persua-
sively support the ultimate conclusion that the FTCA is not appli-
cable to injuries occurring incident to military service. The six ra-
tionales it offered seem to be barely more than a patchwork quilt
hurriedly put together to cover some unseemly and unwelcome
guest. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the opinion is its au-
thor, Justice Jackson, who is generally and justifiably noted for his
lucid and enlightening opinions. What went wrong in Feres? There
is much room to speculate. Since Feres contained no dissenting
opinion, its ultimate conclusion represented the view of a unani-
mous Court, tempered only by the fact that Justice Douglas con-
curred only in the result.35 Perhaps the members of the Court,
though united in result, were in disagreement as to the basic ra-
tionale for that result, and Justice Jackson was visited with the
difficult task of writing an opinion that would reflect enough of
each disparate view to satisfy nearly all, while not elaborating on
any particular rationale sufficiently to compel any member to dis-
sent. Whatever the explanation, the opinion is an embarrassment.
The Feres opinion must have also proved an embarrassment to
the Court, because twenty-seven years later it strained for an op-
nying text.
33. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145 (footnote omitted).




portunity to rethink and recast the rationales for the Feres result.
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,s6 Captain
John Donham ("Donham") was seriously and permanently injured
when the life-support system of his fighter aircraft malfunctioned
during a mid-air emergency. 7 To recover for his injuries, Donham
brought an FTCA action against the government and an action
against Stencel, the manufacturer of the ejection system.38 Stencel,
in turn, cross-claimed against the government, seeking indemnifi-
cation for any recovery Donham might receive from Stencel 9 The
district court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment against the plaintiff, finding that his injuries were incident to
military service, and thus Feres barred the action.40 The district
court also granted the government's motion for summary judgment
against Stencel's cross-claim, because it held that otherwise
Stencel would indirectly recover what Donham could not recover
directly. "I
The decision in Stencel is well in line with the Feres conclusion.
If Feres precluded the plaintiff from recovering from the govern-
ment, but the plaintiff recovered from Stencel and Stencel was
permitted to receive government indemnification, the result would
be that the government would be burdened with the liability for
the plaintiff's injuries incident to military service. Stencel appealed
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.42 The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to "resolve the tension between Feres and
[United States v.] Yellow Cab [Co.] when a member of the Armed
Services brings a tort action against a private defendant and the
latter seeks indemnity from the United States under the . . .Act,




What tension, one might ask? In United States v. Yellow Cab
Co.," two cases were consolidated for decision by the Court. In
36. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
37. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 667.
38. Id. at 667-68.
39. Id. at 668. Stencel's claim for indemnification was based on Missouri law, under
which a passively negligent actor may recover indemnification from an actively negligent
actor. Id. at 668 n.3.
40. Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52, 53 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afl'd, 536 F.2d 765
(8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Stencil Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
(1977).
41. Donham, 395 F. Supp. at 53.
42. Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976).
43. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 670.
44. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
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one, four cab passengers were injured in a collision between the
cab and a U.S. mail truck.4 5 To recover for their injuries, the pas-
sengers sued the cab company, who then impleaded the United
States as a third-party defendant seeking contribution pursuant to
the FTCA.46 In the companion case, a passenger in a streetcar, in-
jured in a collision between the streetcar and a jeep driven by a
soldier acting within the scope of his employment, sued Capital
Transit, who then impleaded the United States as a third-party
defendant seeking contribution pursuant to the FTCA.4' The
Court held that the FTCA subjects the government to contribution
liability through impleader when the plaintiff's injuries are occa-
sioned in part by the negligence of a federal employee. 8 Unlike
Feres, however, in neither of these two actions were the injured
victims on active duty in the armed services. Rather, all were civil-
ians. The "tension" perceived by the Court seems entirely illusory.
The Court, however, used Stencel as the vehicle by which to recast
the rationales for the result achieved in Feres.
In Stencel, the half-dozen reasons offered in Feres were refined
to three. In so doing, the Court eliminated each Feres rationale
purporting to rest on fairness to the soldier. Apparently the Court
recognized the frivolity and perhaps even the cynicism underlying
each of those reasons. With some modification, the Court retained
two of the Feres rationales: (1) the distinctively federal relation-
ship between soldier and government would make the application
of state law mandated by the FTCA inappropriate;' and (2) the
Veterans' Benefits Act.50 As in Feres, however, the Court did not
address the potential assertion that, with regard to the first reason,
the application of state law would be inappropriate only if the al-
leged negligent act or omission were uniquely military in nature. It
also failed to address the fact that the VBA contains no exclusivity
45. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 544.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 545.
48. Id. at 552, 556-57.
49. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671. The Court noted that:
the relationship between the Government and members of its Armed Forces is "dis-
tinctively federal in character," [therefore] it would make little sense to have the
Government's liability to members of the Armed Services dependent on the fortuity
of where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time of the injury.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671. The Court stated that, "the Veterans' Benefits Act es-
tablishes, as a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no-fault' compensation scheme which
provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence attribu-
table to the Government." Id.
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clause, and the fact that the Court itself had fashioned a manner
of adjusting compensation under the VBA and recovery under the
FTCA.
The Court offered as its third rationale one not found anywhere
in Feres: judicial second-guessing of military acts or decisions
would have an adverse effect on discipline.5 1 This third reason does
have a certain facial validity.2 Military service demands discipline,
and judicial second-guessing of military acts or decisions could im-
pair that discipline. On reflection, however, it could just as easily
be asserted that the absence of judicial second-guessing of military
decisions could have an adverse effect on discipline. To the soldier,
the possibility of judicial review and the award of money damages
could make the requisite discipline more acceptable, or at least tol-
erable. Not only was the third reason an afterthought, it could also
be labelled as less than self-evident. One could assert, however,
that three dubious rationales are better than six. The Court then
found all three of these reasons applicable to the relationship be-
tween Stencel and the government and affirmed the judgment for
the government. 3
Then the Court decided United States v. Shearer.5 4 Private
Shearer, while off-duty and off-post, was kidnapped and murdered
by Private Heard, also off-duty and off-post.5 5 Both had been sta-
tioned at Fort Bliss.5 6 Plaintiff, decedent's mother and personal
representative of his estate, brought a wrongful death action
against the government under the FTCA.5 7 Earlier, while stationed
in Germany, Heard had been convicted of manslaughter by a Ger-
man court and sentenced to four years imprisonment.58 Private
Shearer's murder at the hands of Heard occurred after the latter's
release from prison.59 Plaintiff alleged that the Army, aware of
51. Id. at 673. In Stencel, the Court attributed that third reason to its decision in
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671.
52. As this author has previously stated:
The third reason offered by Stencel ...has a compelling legitimacy. After all, if
every or even most military orders were vulnerable to judicial review, those in service
and subject to those orders might be encouraged to reject or disregard those orders
until judicial "approval" were obtained. Clearly that is no way to run an army.
Seidelson, cited at note 3, at 642.
53. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673-74.
54. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
55. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 53.
56. Id. at 53-54.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 54.
59. Id.
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Heard's dangerous nature, had been negligent in failing to exert
reasonable control over him, in failing to warn others of his dan-
gerousness, or in failing to remove him from active duty.60 The
government, asserting the Feres bar, moved for summary judg-
ment."1 The motion was granted by the district court, the Third
Circuit reversed, and the United States Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the Third Circuit, holding the action was precluded by
Feres.e2
After noting that "the Court in Feres based its decision on sev-
eral grounds," the Court in Shearer concluded that the basic rea-
son for the Feres bar was the impropriety of a "civilian court...
second-guess[ing] military decisions. . . [and thus] impair[ing] es-
sential military discipline."3 The Court found that:
[Plaintiff's] complaint strikes at the core of these concerns. In particular,
[plaintiff] alleges that Private Shearer's superiors in the Army "negligently
and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient control over Andrew
Heard, . . . failed to warn other persons that he was at large, [and] negli-
gently and carelessly failed to ... remove Andrew Heard from active mili-
tary duty." . . . This allegation goes directly to the "management" of the
military; it calls into question basic choices about the discipline, supervi-
sion, and control of a serviceman."
Then, in a footnote, the Court wrote, "[a]lthough no longer con-
trolling, other factors mentioned in Feres are present here. It
would be anomalous for the Government's duty to supervise ser-
vicemen to depend on the local law of the various states . . . and
the record shows that Private Shearer's dependents are entitled to
60. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54.
61. In addition, the government asserted that the action was barred by the inten-
tional torts exception to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The Third Circuit concluded that
the intentional torts exception did not bar the action. Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d
1102, 1106 (3d Cir. 1983). On that point, the Court divided 4-4, thereby leaving the Third
Circuit's conclusion undisturbed. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59. Subsequently, in Sheridan v.
United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988), the Court held that the intentional torts exception
would not bar an FTCA action if the alleged negligence of the federal employee would sub-
sist, even if the federal employment status of the intentional tortfeasor were irrelevant.
Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 401. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the
plaintiff would not be permitted to circumvent the intentional tort exception simply by al-
leging negligent hiring or supervision of the intentional tortfeasor by the government. Sheri-
dan, 487 U.S. at 408 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Applying Sheridan retroactively to Shearer,
the intentional torts exception would seem to bar the action. Each of the negligent acts
alleged against the government (see text at note 60) would not constitute negligence had
Heard not been in the Army. The first and third negligent acts alleged would seem to be
equivalent to negligent supervision and hiring (or retention), respectively.
62. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 54.
63. Id. at 57 (citation omitted).
64. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 (footnote omitted).
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statutory veterans' benefits.6 5
Just like that, the three amended reasons for the Feres bar set
forth in Stencel were reduced to one: Judicial second-guessing of
military acts and decisions would have an adverse effect on mili-
tary discipline. The other two reasons were relegated to the judi-
cial dustbin as "no longer controlling." If the Court recognized that
the one remaining reason, critical to decision in Shearer, was never
alluded to in Feres itself, it never let on. How could it? Once all of
the rationales set forth in Feres were repudiated by the Court,
overruling Feres would seem to be the appropriate judicial reac-
tion. Obviously, the Court was not ready to expressly overrule
Feres. Instead, it perpetuated the Feres bar by an after-discovered
rationale. One might argue that the Court's conclusion was judi-
cially awkward, but one could not say that the decision was errone-
ous. The Supreme Court is incapable of legal error, and the infer-
ior federal courts are bound by the Supreme Court's precedents.
Given the Court's inconsistency in identifying reasons for the
Feres bar, it was inevitable that one of the lower courts would be
sandbagged.
In Atkinson v. United States,66 the plaintiff, on active duty in
the Army and in the second trimester of pregnancy, went to an
Army hospital complaining of specific symptoms.6 " The hospital
staff provided no treatment.6 8 Three days later, plaintiff returned
to the hospital and again the staff provided no treatment. 9 Two
weeks later, plaintiff again went to the hospital and was admitted
for treatment of pre-eclampsia, a life-threatening condition for the
mother and the fetus.7 0 As a result of the alleged negligence of the
hospital staff, plaintiff delivered a stillborn child and suffered
physical and emotional injuries. 7 '1 To recover for those injuries,
plaintiff sued the government under the FTCA. 72 Asserting that
the action was barred by Feres, the government moved for sum-
mary judgment, which was granted by the district court.73
When the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
65. Shearer, U.S. at 58 n.4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
66. 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn and supplanted by 825 F.2d 202 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988).
67. Atkinson, 804 F.2d at 561-62.




72. Atkinson, 804 F.2d at 562.
73. Id.
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had already decided Shearer. Interpreting the Shearer decision,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the principal reason for the Feres
bar was the concern that judicial second-guessing of military acts
or decisions would have an adverse effect on discipline. 4 The court
determined that this reason was inapplicable to medical care in a
"non-field military hospital," not involving the kind of military act
or decision which, if examined judicially, would be likely to gener-
ate an adverse effect on military discipline. 6 What about Feres it-
self? Two of the three consolidated cases in Feres involved alleged
medical malpractice. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Atkinson
from Feres by noting that the plaintiff in the instant, case was a
pregnant soldier, a situation not contemplated when Feres was de-
cided.7" Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed."
The reasoning the Ninth Circuit applied in Atkinson raises seri-
ous concerns. The fact that the medical treatment afforded the
plaintiff did not involve uniquely military acts or decisions would
seem to make inapplicable the "distinctively federal relationship"
reason for the Feres bar. Because the allegedly negligent medical
care was not uniquely military in nature, it would not seem im-
proper to determine the government's liability pursuant to the law
of the state where the care occurred. As the Ninth Circuit found,
Shearer had negated this reason. It is not readily apparent why
judicial second-guessing of allegedly negligent medical care af-
forded a pregnant soldier would be less likely to have an adverse
effect on military discipline than judicial second-guessing of alleg-
edly negligent medical care afforded a non-pregnant soldier. Be-
yond the reasoning already noted, the Ninth Circuit did not per-
suasively demonstrate any other rationale.
Still, it is difficult to fault the Ninth Circuit's confusion in At-
kinson, even assuming that such confusion existed. The court scru-
pulously reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions from Feres
through Stencel to Shearer. It noted that Stencel had winnowed
the six bases for the Feres doctrine to three,7 but that the Su-
preme Court's last word was that the major foundation of the doc-
trine was to prevent second-guessing of military decisions and to
preserve military discipline.79
74. Id. at 563.
75. Id. at 564.
76. Id.
77. Atkinson, 804 F.2d at 565.




The Ninth Circuit also recognized that in Shearer:
The Court specifically stated that the other factors enumerated in Feres no
longer are controlling. . . . Thus, the Feres doctrine bars suit only where a
civilian court would be called upon to second-guess military decisions or
where the plaintiff's admitted activities are of the sort that would directly
implicate the need to safeguard military discipline.80
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit repudiated its own precedents when it
held that Feres barred malpractice actions, whether or not it
seemed likely that judicial scrutiny would generate an adverse af-
fect on military discipline."1 These precedents were based on the
desire to fashion "a clear line, '"82 and the repudiation rested on
Shearer's instruction that "'[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be re-
duced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in
light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subse-
quent cases'. '
Consequently, even if the distinction between medical treatment
afforded a pregnant soldier versus a non-pregnant soldier is not
inherently persuasive, the Ninth Circuit's decision was the result
of an assiduous effort to identify and apply the Supreme Court's
latest pronouncement on the reason underlying the Feres bar. To
the extent that the court's effort to distinguish Atkinson from
Feres was not entirely successful, the problem could be explained
in the Supreme Court's repudiation of all the rationales asserted in
Feres. If none of the reasons originally advanced for the Feres bar
has continuing viability, then perhaps any distinction between At-
kinson and Feres would be explicable. Indeed, in these circum-
stances, any distinction between any contemporary case and Feres
becomes plausible and, beyond that, the viability of Feres itself
becomes dubious. Apparently, the Supreme Court recognized the
problem it had created in Shearer, just as in Stencel the Court
recognized the weaknesses inherent in some of the rationales of-
fered in Feres. Once again, the Court set about correcting the
problem.
In United States v. Johnson,8" Lieutenant Commander Johnson,
a Coast Guard helicopter pilot stationed in Hawaii, was dispatched
along with his crew, to search for a vessel in distress.85 Because of
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Atkinson, 804 F.2d at 563.
82. Id. at 564.
83. Id. at 563 (quoting Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57).
84. 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
85. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 682-83.
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inclement weather and poor visibility, Johnson "requested radar
assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"),...
[t]he FAA controllers assumed positive radar control over the heli-
copter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter crashed into the side of a
mountain [and] . . . all the crew members, including Johnson,
were killed in the crash.""6 Johnson's widow and personal repre-
sentative of his estate brought a wrongful death action against the
government pursuant to the FTCA.s' Plaintiff alleged that John-
son's death was due to the negligence of the FAA flight control-
lers.88 The government filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
plaintiff was barred from recovering damages from the federal gov-
ernment, because Johnson died while performing his military du-
ties.8 9 The motion was granted by the district court. The court's
dismissal was based solely on the Supreme Court's decision in
Feres.90 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 1
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the action did not involve military
service." The court determined that since the alleged tortfeasors
were civilian employees of the government, rather than military
employees, judicial second-guessing of the civilian's conduct would
not adversely affect military discipline.
The Eleventh Circuit's original opinion antedated the Supreme
Court's opinion in Shearer. The Eleventh Circuit therefore granted
the government's petition for rehearing en banc, to reconsider the
Johnson case in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Shearer. s
86. Id. at 683.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 683.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd on reh'g, 779
F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). The court noted that:
The complaint in this case alleges that plaintiff's decedent was killed because civilian
FAA air traffic controllers negligently guided the helicopter he was piloting into a
mountain. There is absolutely no hint in the scant record before this court that the
conduct of any alleged tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial. Nor is there a suggestion that examining the
conduct of a civilian would in any way implicate the military services. Since the pros-
ecution of plaintiff's claim cannot conceivably involve or compromise a military rela-
tionship or, for that matter, the military discipline structure, the prosecution of
plaintiff's claim will not encroach upon the rationale which "serves largely if not ex-
clusively as the predicate for the Feres doctrine."
Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539 (footnote omitted) (quoting in part Hunt v. United States, 636
F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
93. Johnson v. United States, 760 F.2d 244 (11th Cir. 1985).
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By the time the en banc consideration occurred, Shearer had been
decided by the Court. In a per curiam opinion, a majority of the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Shearer "reinforce[d] the analysis
set forth in the panel opinion.
94
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed, holding that the
cause of action in Johnson was barred by FeresY5 What led the
Court to that conclusion? The opinion indicates that Stencel re-
quired the reversal.9 6 The Court's opinion then restated the three
rationales offered in Stencel: (1) the distinctively federal relation-
ship between soldier and government would make the application
of state law inappropriate; (2) the VBA was intended to be the
exclusive remedy for injuries incident to military service; and (3)
judicial second-guessing of military acts and decisions would have
an adverse effect on military discipline.97 What happened to
Shearer, which stated that the first two reasons were "no longer
controlling"? The Court cited Shearer in support of the third rea-
son, and simply ignored that portion of Shearer that seemed to
negate the first two reasons. 8
The Court then found each of the three Stencel reasons for the
Feres bar applicable to Johnson. Since decedent's death-producing
injuries had been incident to his military service, the first reason
applied. 9 Because his widow had applied for and received compen-
sation for her husband's death pursuant to the Veterans' Benefits
Act, the second reason applied.100 What about the third reason?
How would judicial second-guessing of the alleged negligent con-
duct of civilian employees of the government generate an adverse
effect on military discipline? The Court wrote:
Even if military negligence is not specifically alleged in a tort action, a suit
based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judg-
ments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
the military mission. Moreover, military discipline involves not only obedi-
ence to orders, but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to
one's country. Suits brought by service members against the Government
for service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to ef-
94. Johnson, 779 F.2d at 1493.
95. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692.
96. Id. at 688-89. The Court stated that, "[t]his Court has emphasized three broad
rationales underlying the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States. Id.
97. Id. at 689-90.
98. Id. at 690-91.
99. Id. at 691.
100. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691.
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fective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in
the broadest sense of the word.'10
If the language appearing after "Moreover" in the above excerpt is
correctly understood by this author, it would imply that a service
person who brings an FTCA action to recover for negligently in-
flicted injuries manifests disloyalty to his service and to his coun-
try. This interpretation requires reading "military discipline in the
broadest sense of the word." However, the Johnson Court limited
such a broad and discomfiting reading by the language it included
in a footnote immediately before the word "Moreover."
The Johnson Court stated that civilian employees of the Gov-
ernment may also:
[P]lay an integral role in military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry
into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline
as a direct inquiry into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the
United States Armed Services have an established working relationship that
provides for FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA,
United States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military
Operations (Jan. 21, 1981).02
This footnote language provides a rather clear basis for conclud-
ing that judicial second-guessing of the conduct of the allegedly
negligent FAA controllers would generate an adverse effect on mili-
tary discipline. After all, those controllers were actively engaged in
assisting Lieutenant Commander Johnson in the performance of
his military mission of searching for a vessel in distress. Still, it
would have been a little more reassuring and a little less discom-
fiting if that language had appeared in the text of the Court's opin-
ion, rather than, or at least in addition to, the language suggesting
disloyalty to service and country arising from the filing of a
lawsuit. 103
101. Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 n.11.
103. Justice Powell, author of the Court's opinion in Johnson, subsequently used lan-
guage considerably more sympathetic to the victim of military negligence. In Harduvel v.
General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990),
Justice Powell, who was retired from the Supreme Court and was sitting by designation on
the Eleventh Circuit, reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and remanded for entry of judg-
ment for the defendant on the basis that the three conditions for the government contractor
defense set forth in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (see notes 237-
264 and accompanying text) were met. Harduvel, 878 F.2d at 1322. He wrote:
Young servicemen such as Captain Harduvel represent the very best of our Na-
tion's citizens. Americans take pride in their bravery and skill, and mourn when their
lives are tragically lost.. . . Although the [government contractor] defense may some-
times seem harsh in its operation, it is a necessary consequence of the incompatibility
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Justice Scalia, with three members joining, filed a dissenting
opinion in Johnson.0 4 The dissent concluded that Feres had been
"wrongly decided.' 10 5 The dissent noted, however, that since "[w]e
have not been asked by the [plaintiff] to overrule Feres, [we] need
not resolve whether considerations of stare decisis should induce
us, despite the plain error of the case, to leave bad enough
alone." 0 16
Rather, the dissent would have declined to apply Feres to a case
in which the allegedly negligent actors were civilian employees of
the government. The dissent candidly conceded that the limitation
it sought was more a product of pragmatism than logical symme-
try: "[We] confess that the line between FTCA suits alleging mili-
tary negligence and those alleging civilian negligence has nothing
to recommend it except that it would limit our clearly wrong deci-
sion in Feres and confine the unfairness and irrationality that deci-
sion has bred. But that, [we] think, is justification enough.' 10 7
These are harsh words to direct at a Supreme Court opinion that
had stood for nearly forty years. Yet, as the dissent noted, the
Court itself had disavowed the reasons originally offered in Feres
and substituted as the only rationale (until Johnson resurrected
the other two) the after-discovered military discipline concern.108
Moreover, the dissent concluded that none of the reasons that the
Court has asserted, from Feres through Shearer, persuasively sup-
ported the Feres bar. 09
Does Congressional failure to amend the FTCA in the years
since Feres bespeak congressional acquiescence in the Court's in-
terpretation of the Act? To the majority it did.1 0 To the dissent it
did not. As the dissent noted:
[We] cannot take comfort, as the Court does from Congress' failure to
amend the FTCA to overturn Feres. The unlegislated desires of later Con-
gresses with regard to one thread in the fabric of the FTCA could hardly
have any bearing upon the proper interpretation of the entire fabric of com-
promises that their predecessors enacted into law in 1946. And even if they
of modern products liability law and the exigencies of national defense.
Id.
104. The other three dissenters were Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. John-
son, 481 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105.. Id. at 700.
106. Id. at 703.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 698-99.
109. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 689 n.9.
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could, intuiting those desires from congressional failure to act is an uncer-
tain enterprise which takes as its starting point disregard of the checks and
balances in the constitutional scheme of legislation designed to assure that
not all desires of a majority of the Legislature find their way into law.",
The above-quoted passage was, of course, written by the dissent.
The Court, as we have seen, reaffirmed Feres and resurrected all
three reasons for that decision enunciated in Stencel.
Where does that leave the Ninth Circuit and its decision in At-
kinson, which was predicated on Shearer's emphasis on the mili-
tary discipline rationale and characterization of the other two
Stencel reasons as "no longer controlling?" It seems to be
sandbagged. The Ninth Circuit granted the government's petition
for rehearing and, "[iun light of United States v. Johnson," with-
drew its earlier opinion and issued a new opinion, this time af-
firming the district court's entry of summary judgment for the
government. '12
CONGRESSIONAL AND SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF THE Feres
ISSUE
How would Congress resolve the issue, if it were to consider it?
Obviously, that question defies any definitive answer. The best one
can offer is speculation. One speculation, especially in light of the
substantial national debt, is that Congress, concerned about pro-
tecting the public fisc, would not legislatively overrule Feres.
How should the Supreme Court react to its own inconstancy in
fashioning reasons for the Feres bar, the apparent lack of persua-
siveness of those reasons, singly or in combination, the scathing
dissent in Johnson, and the lack of clear guidance to lower federal
courts? Two basic options are available to the Court: Either con-
111. Id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1987). The court stated:
Simply put, Johnson appears to breathe new life into the first two Feres rationales,
which until that time had been largely discredited and abandoned. See [Johnson, 107
S. Ct.] at 2071-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the Shearer statement that the first
two rationales are "no longer controlling").
In view of these circumstances, we are compelled to affirm the decision of the dis-
trict court on the basis of Feres and Johnson. Although we believe that the military
discipline rationale does not support application of the Feres doctrine in this case,
the first two rationales support its application. ...
We are . . .reluctant to carve out an exception to the Feres doctrine after five
members of the Court appear to have emphatically endorsed Feres and all three of its
rationales. That task, if it is to be undertaken at all, is properly left to the Supreme
Court or to Congress.
Atkinson. 825 F.2d at 205-06 (footnote omitted).
1994
fess error and overrule Feres, or retain Feres and confess error in
identifying its underlying rationales, supplanting those unpersua-
sive reasons with some unifying theory that may be more helpful
in providing guidance to lower courts in subsequent cases.
Frankly, the willingness of four Justices in Johnson to label
Feres as wrongly decided, and their apparent readiness to overrule
it had they been so invited, was surprising. Given the views of four
members of the Court, perhaps actual overruling of Feres is a fea-
sible alternative in the foreseeable future. Yet it is doubtful for
several reasons. First, two of the four dissenters in Johnson are no
longer on the Court.113 While it is true that the author and one of
the Justices who joined the Court's opinion in Johnson have also
retired from the Court,11 4 all three of the other Justices who com-
prised the majority remain on the Court.115 Thus, of the five re-
maining members, presumably three would favor retaining Feres
and only two would overrule. Recognizing that such head-counting
is a risky enterprise, and any Justice is free to change his or her
mind, the numbers still do not augur well for overruling.
Second, the four dissenters in Johnson, although finding Feres
wrongly decided, did not vote to overrule it. It is true they were
not "asked to overrule," but it can be assumed that, even unin-
vited, they had the capacity to vote for overruling Feres. The fact
that they did not suggests something less than fervor in their con-
clusion that Feres was wrong. That lack of fervor is corroborated
by the somewhat awkward conclusion for which they did vote: re-
stricted application having "nothing to recommend it except that
it would limit our clearly wrong decision in Feres."116
Third, despite Justice Scalia's discounting of the significance of
congressional inaction in the then thirty-seven years since Feres, a
majority of the Court would probably continue to find it difficult to
ignore the apparent congressional acquiescence. There is an incul-
cated and appropriate sensitivity on the part of the Court to the
prerogatives of Congress.
Finally, a majority of the Court would surely find it difficult to
jeopardize the integrity of the public fisc by the incursion that
overruling Feres would almost certainly stimulate. While it is true
that it would be the responsibility of Congress, not the Court, to
113. Justices Brennan and Marshall.
114. Justices Powell and White.
115. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and O'Connor remain as active
members of the Court.
116. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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generate the necessary revenue, the Court would be understanda-
bly reluctant to impose that onus on Congress. The Court would
also recognize the likelihood that if it overruled Feres, Congress,
rather than generate the necessary additional revenue, might very
well amend the FTCA to restore a Feres-like exception. While in a
legalistic sense, amending the FTCA might be a purer method of
resolution, it is hardly likely to appeal to the Court's pragmatic
inclinations. Since the Court is not likely to overrule Feres in the
foreseeable future, it should confess error in articulating the ratio-
nales for that decision, something it has already done (albeit tac-
itly and inconsistently), and seek to identify a rationale that might
have continuing persuasiveness and serve as a useful guide to lower
courts.
A SUGGESTED RATIONALE FOR Feres
What type of rationale would possess such persuasiveness and
serve as a useful guide for lower courts? The previously stated ru-
minations about speculative action on the part of Congress and the
Court may have suggested a beginning point for fashioning such a
rationale: to protect the public fisc. The Court could conclude that
Congress, in enacting the FTCA, had not intended to subject the
fisc to the predictably large charges that would be generated by
negligently inflicted injuries arising out of activities incident to
military service, given the inherently dangerous nature of such ac-
tivities. This rationale suggests that the Court could conclude that
the Feres bar is applicable only to those injuries that are truly inci-
dent to military service. It would also have the advantage of main-
taining the basic view of Feres, that Congress had not intended the
Act to apply to injuries "aris[ing] out of . . or [occurring] in the
course of activity incident to service," '117 without the disadvantage
of any of the awkward, inconsistently applied reasons set forth in
Feres, Stencel, Shearer, and Johnson.
How would this protection of the public fisc rationale have oper-
ated in Johnson? Since it is apparent that Lieutenant Commander
Johnson sustained death-producing injuries while attempting to
rescue a vessel in distress, an activity clearly within the function of
the Coast Guard, the wrongful death action would be barred. The
bar would subsist without the need to consider any of the six,
three, one, or three reasons respectively and alternatively offered
in Feres, Stencel, Shearer, and Johnson. How would this have af-
117. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
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fected the three cases consolidated for decision in Feres? Two of
those actions were predicated on medical malpractice. Assuming
that the medical treatment afforded had no relationship to any in-
jury or ailment resulting from an activity incident to military ser-
vice, then the suggested rationale would be inapplicable and the
actions would be cognizable under the FTCA. Similarly, in Atkin-
son, where the alleged medical malpractice occurred in the provi-
sion of pre-natal care, the victim's injury certainly did not arise out
of any activity incident to her military service, and thus the action
would be maintainable.
Suppose though, that the allegedly negligent medical treatment
was provided for an injury that had occurred as the result of an
activity incident to military service. Clearly, the suggested ration-
ale would preclude an FTCA action for the initial injury, even if
negligently inflicted. What would that rationale suggest with re-
gard to an action to recover damages for the exacerbation of the
original injury, where the exacerbation was due to military medical
malpractice? Generally, where a defendant's negligence causes per-
sonal injuries to the plaintiff requiring medical attention, and that
attention is negligently provided, the initial tortfeasor is liable for
the totality of the consequences, both the initial injuries and the
exacerbation thereof.118 The usual rationale for that conclusion is
that, where the initial injuries make subsequent medical care fore-
seeable, subsequent negligent medical care is also reasonably fore-
seeable. " 9 At the same time, the plaintiff is free to sue the original
tortfeasor for the totality of the consequences, and also the negli-
gent medical care provider for the exacerbation occasioned by him.
Indeed, this reasoning suggests a certain dichotomy. As far as the
original tortfeasor is concerned, his negligence and the subsequent
negligence of the medical care provider create one cause of action.
However, as far as the medical care provider is concerned, his neg-
ligence creates an independent action against him. For Feres pur-
poses, should the action against the government, the employer of
both the initial tortfeasor and the negligent medical care provider,
be deemed one action, and therefore barred, or should they be
deemed two actions, with the second not barred? The suggested
rationale does not require the issue to be resolved on the basis of a
distinction so elusive or nebulous. That rationale asserts that Con-
118. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44 at 309-
10 nn.80-86 (5th ed. 1984).
119. Id.
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gress, in enacting the FTCA, did not intend to subject the fisc to
claims for injuries incurred in activities incident to military ser-
vice, given the inherently dangerous nature of those activities and
the predictably large numbers of such claims. Since negligent med-
ical care is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such injuries,
claims arising out of such care would also be considered barred.
Suppose the negligent medical care is provided by a government
employee after the victim has been discharged from the service,
maybe at a VA hospital. Should a claim seeking damages for the
exacerbation of injuries occasioned by that post-discharge treat-
ment be deemed barred by our rationale? United States v.
Brown' ° provides an apt analogy. Plaintiff, while in the service,
sustained an injury to his left knee. ' After his discharge, the
plaintiff had surgery performed on the knee at a VA hospital.'
Due to the use of an allegedly defective tourniquet during the op-
eration, plaintiff suffered serious and permanent injury to the
nerves in the leg.12 3 To recover for that injury, plaintiff sued the
government under the FTCA.'"" Plaintiff had received VBA bene-
fits for the original service injury, and that award was increased
after the surgery.'2 5 The government moved to dismiss under
Feres.'26 The district court granted the motion, the court of ap-
peals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.' 7
To the Court, it was dispositive that the injury for which dam-
ages were sought was the result of surgery performed while the
plaintiff was a civilian.' Moreover, as noted previously by the au-
thor,' 9 the Court concluded that the VBA benefits and any judg-
ment secured by the plaintiff in the FTCA action could be ad-
justed by deducting the former from the latter.' 30
It is not entirely clear from the Court's opinion whether the orig-
inal injury was sustained as the result of an activity incident to
military service.' 3 ' If it was not, under this author's suggested ra-
120. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
121. Brown, 348 U.S. at 110.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 110-11.
124. Id. at 110.
125. Id. at 111.
126. Brown, 348 U.S. at 111.
127. Id. at 111, 113.
128. Id. at 112.
129. See note 32 and accompanying text.
130. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
131. The Second Circuit opinion states that "the plaintiff, while in active service, had
been injured in the left knee during military operations in New Guinea." Brown v. United
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tionale, Feres would not bar an FTCA action for all injuries, initial
and subsequent. If the original injury was sustained while perform-
ing military duties, what does the rationale suggest? It has already
been determined that if the original injury arose out of an activity
that was incident to military service, the rationale would preclude
recovery for damages attributable to the initial injury, as well as
for damages attributable to subsequent negligent military medical
care. If Congress did not intend to expose the fisc to liability for
injuries arising out of an activity incident to military service, given
the inherently dangerous nature of such activities, Congress pre-
sumably did not intend to expose the fisc to liability arising out of
reasonably foreseeable negligent medical care for those injuries.
The same reasoning appears equally applicable whether the subse-
quent medical malpractice by government health providers occurs
before or after the plaintiff's discharge from service. Consequently,
the public fisc rationale would produce a result contrary to that
achieved by the Court in Brown.
How would this hypothetical rationale affect the first case con-
solidated for decision in Feres? There, decedent died in a fire in
military barracks. 32 The complaint alleged that the government
was negligent for housing the plaintiff in barracks which the gov-
ernment knew or should have known were unsafe, due to a defec-
tive heating plant.133 One might assert that because decedent's
death-producing injuries occurred on-post, and because quartering
soldiers is an essential part of military service, those injuries
should be deemed incident to military service. This is not a per-
suasive assertion. Decedent might have been asleep at the time of
the fatal fire, or writing a letter home, or reading a magazine. Ab-
sent evidence that decedent was exposed to the risk of fire as a
result of his having been engaged in an activity incident to military
service, the suggested rationale, protecting the fisc from damages
arising out of the inherently dangerous nature of activities incident
to military service, would point to permitting the action to proceed
pursuant to the FTCA.
How would the suggested rationale apply to other, perhaps more
difficult factual patterns? In Del Rio v. United States,3 4 the plain-
tiff, on active duty in the Navy, allegedly received negligent pre-
natal care by Navy physicians resulting in personal injuries to her,
States, 209 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
132. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
133. Id.
134. 833 F.2d 282 (11th Cir. 1987).
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personal injuries to Frederick, a twin who survived, and the death
of Michael, the other twin, who lived only five days.' Plaintiff
initiated three actions; one in her individual capacity to recover for
her personal injuries, one as next friend of Frederick to recover for
his personal injuries, and a wrongful death action arising out of the
death of Michael, brought by the plaintiff as personal representa-
tive of decedent's estate."3 6 The government moved to dismiss all
three actions pursuant to Feres.137 The district court granted the
motions.138 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. 3 9
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Johnson Court "unequivo-
cally expanded the Feres analysis to include all three rationales
[set forth in Stencel].1'' 40 Finding all three of those rationales ap-
plicable to the action for personal injuries to the plaintiff, the
court affirmed the dismissal of that action."' However, the court
concluded that none of the three rationales applied to the claim for
injuries to Frederick, a dependent child of the service member. 4'
Therefore, the court reversed dismissal of that action and re-
manded it for further proceedings.143 With regard to the wrongful
death action arising from the death of Michael, the court, noting
that the mother would receive money damages if the action pro-
duced a judgment for the plaintiff, concluded that this action, like
the plaintiff's individual action, was also Feres barred.
44
In Irvin v. United States, 45 the plaintiff, on active duty in the
Army, allegedly received negligent pre-natal care from Army phy-
sicians resulting in personal injuries to her and the death of her
four-day old daughter, Quintessa.'16 Plaintiff and her husband ini-
tiated two actions; one to recover for the personal injuries to the
plaintiff, and one to recover damages for the death of their daugh-
ter. 4 7 The district court granted the government's motion to dis-




139. Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 288.
140. Id. at 285-86.
141. Id. at 286.
142. Id. at 287.
143. Id. at 288.
144. Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 288.
145. 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1989).




miss both actions pursuant to Feres,'148 and the, Sixth Circuit
affirmed.
149
The Sixth Circuit, noting that the Supreme Court in Johnson
had reaffirmed Stencel's three reasons for the Feres bar, found all
three applicable to the action for personal injuries to the plain-
tiff. 5 ' As to the death of Quintessa, the court found-that the treat-
ment accorded the mother was inseparable from the treatment ac-
corded Quintessa as a fetus.' 5 ' Given the common genesis of the
injuries to both, and the fact that the mother's action was Feres
barred, the court concluded that the action arising out of the death
of Quintessa was likewise barred. 52 Moreover, the court explicitly
repudiated the conclusion achieved by the Eleventh Circuit in Del
Rio, that the action for injuries to the surviving child was not
barred. 53 The Sixth Circuit concluded that "the genesis test" ap-
plied by it was more consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinions.1
54
There is an obvious unseemliness in having two circuits, both
purporting to rely on Supreme Court opinions, achieve inconsistent
results in analogous circumstances. Still, given the Court's incon-
stancy in identifying and applying the reasons underlying Feres,
such unseemliness is hardly surprising. How would Del Rio and Ir-
vin be resolved under the rationale recommended by this author?
Clearly, in neither case was the injury to the service person one
arising out of an activity incident to military service. Neither be-
coming pregnant nor pregnancy itself is such an activity. There-
fore, the suggested rationale would lead to the conclusion that
none of the actions in the two cases would be Feres barred.
Next, try the suggested rationale on Shearer. Private Shearer
was kidnapped and murdered by Private Heard while both were
off-duty and off-post. 5 To the Court, the plaintiff's claim that the
Army had negligently failed to control Heard struck at the core of
the concerns over a civilian court second-guessing military deci-
sions and thus impairing essential military discipline. 56 It there-
fore barred the negligence action under Feres. Analyzing the opin-
148. Id. at 128.
149. Id. at 131.
150. Id. at 130.
151. Irvin, 845 F.2d at 131.
152. Id. at 131.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 53.
156. Id. at 57-58.
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ion under the suggested rationale, it would be argued that
Congress did not intend to expose the fisc to damage awards for
negligently caused injuries arising out of activities incident to mili-
tary service, given the inherent danger of such activities. There-
fore, the relevant inquiry in Shearer would be: Did the death-pro-
ducing injuries sustained by the victim arise out of an activity
incident to military service? Since at the time of the kidnapping
and murder, Private Shearer was off-duty and off-post, the answer
would be no, and Feres would not bar the action.
Another type of claim that should be examined includes those
actions in which a soldier is injured while engaging in an activity
incident to military service, and his injuries in turn generate inju-
ries to civilian relatives. In some of the cases, the injuries to the
service person were caused by handling radioactive materials while
assisting in the Manhattan Project.157 In others, the service per-
son's injuries resulted from exposure to nuclear bomb testing.158 In
several cases, the soldiers' injuries resulted from exposure to Agent
Orange.159 In addition to the actions initiated by service personnel,
actions were initiated on behalf of their children for genetic defects
flowing from the original service-connected injuries and by their
spouses for emotional distress occasioned by the injuries sustained
by the service personnel and by their children.6 0 Not surprisingly,
given the Supreme Court's inconsistency in identifying and apply-
ing the reasons underlying Feres, the opinions produced in the
cases involving radioactive materials, nuclear bomb testing, and
Agent Orange are hardly consistent either in result or reasoning.
How would those cases be resolved through utilization of our
suggested rationale? In all of the cases, the initial injuries to the
service personnel were sustained while the personnel were engaged
in an activity incident to military service. For that reason, the
claims of those plaintiffs would be precluded by Feres. Suppose,
however, that in addition to the original negligence that occasioned
those injuries, there was subsequent governmental negligence in
failing to provide a timely warning to the then discharged victims,
157. See, e.g., Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
158. See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nora.
Laswell v. Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983).
159. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Chapman v. Dow Chemical Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
160. See notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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and that such subsequent negligence exacerbated the initial inju-
ries. How should the rationale suggested by the author apply? It
should lead to the conclusion that Feres precludes recovery for the
exacerbated injuries. Exacerbation of injuries arising out of an ac-
tivity incident to military service, even by post-discharge negli-
gence, is hardly an extraordinary, unforeseeable event. To subject
the fisc to vulnerability to such claims would be to subject the gov-
ernment to liability for injuries having been occasioned initially by
negligence relating to activities incident to military service. Vul-
nerability to liability for such foreseeable, post-discharge aggrava-
tion would impact on the fisc in much the same manner as would
such vulnerability for the initial injuries. Both would subject the
fisc to liability for injuries having their origin in the inherently
dangerous activities incident to military service.
How would the claims asserted by the civilian children and
spouses of the military personnel be treated? These claims also
would deplete the fisc as the result of inherently dangerous activi-
ties incident to military service. Whether one characterizes the
claims of children and spouses as "derivative," '161 or utilizes a "gen-
esis"162 test, or a "but for" '63 test (all of these phrases have been
employed by courts attempting to apply the Supreme Court's rea-
sons for the Feres bar), the critical fact under the proposed ration-
ale is that all of these types of claims arise out of the initial inju-
ries to service persons who were, at the time of injury, engaged in
activities incident to military service. To subject the government to
liability for such claims, would be to expose the fisc to depletion as
the ultimate consequence of the inherently dangerous activities un-
dertaken incident to military service. Thus, the suggested rationale
would preclude all such actions.
In another factual pattern, the plaintiff's husband, an Air Force
officer, was seriously injured in a plane crash allegedly resulting
from negligence on the part of the Air Force.16' The plaintiff sued
the government under the FTCA to recover damages for the loss of
consortium she sustained by reason of her husband's personal inju-
ries. 165 The government moved to dismiss on the basis of Feres.'6"
161. Lombard, 690 F.2d at 223.
162. Irvin, 845 F.2d at 130.
163. Lombard, 690 F.2d at 223.
164. Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 531 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd without
opinion, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980).
165. Harrison, 479 F. Supp. at 531.
166. Id. at 531-32.
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The plaintiff resisted the motion by arguing that, even though her
husband would be precluded from suing by Feres, her consortium
claim should not be barred because, under the applicable state law,
the consortium claim was characterized as independent not deriva-
tive. 67 The district court granted the motion to dismiss. 168 The
Second Circuit affirmed without opinion and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.1
6 9
The district court's opinion, unelaborated by appellate consider-
ation, is hardly a model of clarity. The court, characterizing the
case as one of first impression, 170 employed the three reasons for
the Feres bar set forth in Stencel'7' with the half-dozen reasons
appearing in Feres, shook well and concluded that the FTCA
"does not support such a claim . . . in that it does not fit within
the government's consent to liability expressed in the Act.' ' 7 3
What result would the suggested public fisc rationale produce?
Since the plaintiff's claim clearly arose from the injuries sustained
by her husband while he was engaged in an activity incident to
military service, the consortium action would be precluded. Is that
conclusion undercut by the asserted state-law characterization of
such actions as independent rather than derivative? It probably is
not. While it is true that the Act provides that the government's
liability is to be determined by the law of the state where the gov-
ernmental negligence occurred, the Act does not provide that the
scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity is to be controlled by
any state law.77 Rather, this issue goes to the subject matter juris-
diction of federal district courts, and such issues are necessarily
governed by federal law. Under the suggested rationale, it is hy-
pothesized that Congress, in enacting the FTCA, did not intend to
waive sovereign immunity with regard to injuries sustained in ac-
tivities incident to military service, given the inherent danger of
such activities and the consequential impact on the fisc. It is ap-
parent that the plaintiff's consortium action, however character-
ized by state law, arose out of and represents an aspect of liability
flowing from the injuries to her husband. Consequently, the au-
167. Id. at 532.
168. Id. at 531.
169. Harrison v. United States, 449 U.S. 828 (1980).
170. Harrison, 479 F. Supp. at 533.
171. Id. at 534.
172. Id. at 533-34.
173. Id. at 536.
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
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thor's suggested rationale, like the court's opinion, would bar the
action. Using the reasoning suggested here would spare the court
the awkwardness and perhaps even embarrassment of wading
through the numerous and varied reasons assigned by the Supreme
Court at different times.
The suggested rationale can be tested on two additional cases. In
C.R.S. v. United States,'17 the plaintiff-husband, while a member
of the Minnesota National Guard and on active duty at Fort Ben-
ning, Georgia, underwent abdominal surgery."' 6 The surgery was
performed at an Army hospital, where the plaintiff-husband re-
ceived blood transfusions. 7 ' He recovered from his surgery with no
complications, and completed his military duty.178 He married the
plaintiff-wife and she bore three children, the youngest of whom,
the plaintiff-child, tested positive for the HIV virus.'7 9 Subse-
quently, both husband and wife had positive results from an AIDS
test. 80 Alleging that the blood transfusions given to the husband
during the surgery constituted the source of the virus, the three
plaintiffs brought FTCA actions against the United States.' The
government, asserting the Feres bar, moved to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. 82
The court identified the three reasons for Feres, reaffirmed in
Johnson.'a3 Because the Veterans Administration had denied ben-
efits to the husband, the court concluded that the exclusivity rea-
son did not apply to the case.' 8" The court stated that the "dis-
tinctly federal" nature of the relationship was not present due to
the lack of veterans' benefits. 8 5 As for the third reason, the court
decided that military discipline was not threatened because the
plaintiff was no longer a member of the military and the injury was
175. 761 F. Supp. 665 (D. Minn. 1991).





181. C.R.S., 761 F. Supp. at 666.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 667-68.
184. Id. at 668.
185. Id. The court wrote:
The government's concern with the "distinctively federal" relationship cannot be
given weight in the absence of veterans' benefits. The uniformity that the Feres Court
sought to provide (by prohibiting the application through the FTCA of various state
tort laws) was to be established through the "generous statutory disability and death
benefits" ... of the Veterans' Benefits Act.
Id. (quoting in part United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 689 (1987)).
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not related to military activity. 181
The court held that Feres did not bar the claims because the
claims did not implicate the three bases for the Feres doctrine.'
8 7
The court then denied the government's alternative motions.1 88 Al-
most as an afterthought, the court added, "[iln the present case, it
is highly questionable that elective surgery wholly unrelated to a
serviceman's military duties is 'incident to service'.. '89
In light of the Supreme Court's precedents, it is not surprising
that the court's analysis in the C.R.S. case is somewhat confusing.
To hold that the second reason noted in Stencel and reaffirmed in
Johnson (after being deleted by Shearer)-"[t]he Veterans' Bene-
fits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no
fault' compensation scheme which provides generous pensions to
injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence attributable
to the Government""°-is not applicable because the VA denied
such benefits to husband-plaintiff, is to invite great mischief. First,
it grants to the government the power to preclude or permit an
FTCA action simply by granting or denying VBA benefits. Second,
it grants to the claimant an even anterior power to preclude or per-
mit his contemplated FTCA action by deciding whether or not to
seek VBA benefits. It is difficult to imagine that the Supreme
Court ever anticipated such a result or believed that Congress had
so intended. Next, to hold, as the district court did, that because
the Veterans Administration had denied VBA benefits, the "dis-
tinctively federal relationship" reason did not apply, appears to be
a non sequitur. Even absent the award of such benefits, the as-
sumed impropriety of applying the law of the state where the gov-
ernmental negligence occurred to the relationship between soldier
and government would subsist.
The district court's method of dealing with the third reason, mil-
itary discipline, is somewhat more logical. Judicial second-guessing
186. C.R.S., 761 F. Supp. at 668. The court held that:
Plaintiffs' claims, in contrast to those reviewed by the Supreme Court in Johnson,
have very little "potential ... [to] implicate military discipline." ... Allowing a suit
by a former member of the military for acts unrelated to the military mission does
not, on these facts, threaten the integrity of military decision making. Furthermore,
some inquiry into military activities and decision making is not a sufficient rationale
for barring all suits. The same, or even greater, level of inquiry may result when a
civilian sues the government for conduct related to military activities.
Id. (quoting Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 670.
189. Id. at 669.
190. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671.
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of military acts or decisions relating to surgery does seem to pos-
sess less likelihood of generating an adverse effect on military dis-
cipline than the acts and decisions at issue in Johnson.91 Still, the
district court's opinion leaves unanswered two critical questions
with regard to the military discipline reason. First, would a poten-
tial judicial determination that the Army had provided negligent
and possibly fatal medical care to a soldier not generate a signifi-
cant adverse effect on the morale and discipline of other soldiers?
Second, what about Feres itself? In Feres, two of the three actions
consolidated for decision involved military medical malpractice
analogous to that in the case before the district court.
Each of the difficulties noted in the district court's opinion re-
flects the confusion generated by the Supreme Court's inconstancy
in identifying the reasons underlying Feres and the lack of persua-
siveness of each of those reasons. It is only as an afterthought that
the district court's language takes on an inherent thrust of persua-
siveness and logic. It states that of course "it is highly questionable
that elective surgery wholly unrelated to a serviceman's military
duties is 'incident to service.' "192 The logical consequence of this
language is the suggested rationale for the Feres bar. Congress, in
enacting the FTCA, did not intend to expose the fisc to claims for
injuries occasioned by activities incident to military service, given
the inherently dangerous nature of such activities. Were the Su-
preme Court to embrace that single rationale for the Feres bar, the
Court would eliminate the confusion pervasive in the lower courts'
opinions, provide a persuasive reason for Feres, and enormously
simplify the judicial task of determining when an FTCA action is
and is not precluded. In C.R.S., once it concluded that the surgery
had not been occasioned by any injury sustained in an activity in-
cident to military service, the court would have known that Feres
did not bar the action.
In M.M.H. v. United States,193 while the plaintiff was on active
duty in the Army, a military doctor misdiagnosed the plaintiff as
having been infected with the HIV virus.1 94 The Army notified the
plaintiff that she was so infected. 95 After the plaintiff's discharge,
191. C.R.S., 761 F. Supp. at 668. In Johnson, the FAA controllers' alleged negligence
resulted in the deaths of all aboard a Coast Guard helicopter attempting to rescue a vessel
in distress, a basic Coast Guard function. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 683.
192. C.R.S., 761 F. Supp. at 669.
193. 966 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1992).
194. M.M.H., 966 F.2d at 286.
195. Id.
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the Army discovered its error, yet never notified the plaintiff of its
error.196 The plaintiff sued the government under the FTCA, seek-
ing to recover for the exacerbated emotional distress she sustained
as the result of the post-discharge negligent failure to inform her
that she was not AIDS-infected. 197 The government moved for
summary judgment on the basis of Feres.98 The district court
granted the motion but the Seventh Circuit reversed. 99
The Seventh Circuit identified the three reasons for Feres that
were identified by the Supreme Court in Stencel and reaffirmed by
the Court in Johnson.2 " The court then concluded that none of
those reasons applied to the alleged post-discharge negligence of
the Army, characterizing post-discharge discovery and failure to
notify as an "independent negligent act."201 The court noted that,
had the Army "simply failed to rectify [its] prior mistake, this fail-
ure might be one continuous tort," thus requiring the application
of Feres.2°0 In short, what saved the action from the Feres bar was
that "the plaintiff presented evidence that the government learned
of its mistake after the plaintiff's discharge.
20 3
How would the suggested rationale apply to the M.M.H. case?
Assuming that the mislabelled blood sample had not resulted from
an injury sustained in an activity incident to military service, Feres
would not bar the action, regardless of whether or not the Army
had committed a new and "independent tort after discharge.
'20 4
Thus, using the proposed rationale, the distinction between contin-
uous negligence and an independent post-discharge negligent act,
apparently critical under the Supreme Court's three rationales in
Feres, would be irrelevant.
Assuming, contrary to the apparent facts in M.M.H., that the
mislabelled blood sample had resulted from medical treatment af-
forded the victim for an injury sustained in an activity that was
incident to military service, then the suggested rationale would
point to the conclusion that the pre-discharge negligence and its
injurious consequences were not cognizable in an FTCA action.
196. Id. at 287.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. M.M.H., 966 F.2d at 287.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 289.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. M.M.H., 966 F.2d at 288 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 131 at 1036 n.44 (5th ed. 1984)).
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The Seventh Circuit presumably would arrive at the same conclu-
sion if it applied the Court's three rationales. The rationale pro-
posed by this author would preclude the action because of the con-
clusion that, in enacting the FTCA, Congress had not intended to
expose the fisc to claims for injuries sustained in an activity inci-
dent to military service, given the danger inherent in such activi-
ties. This conclusion would also preclude claims arising out of neg-
ligent medical treatment of such injuries, given the predictable
frequency of such injuries and reasonably foreseeable intervening
medical negligence. Suppose, however, there was post-discharge
negligence associated with medical treatment, which was attributa-
ble to the government. What would the hypothetical rationale sug-
gest? It would point toward precluding such an action for exactly
the same reason: the predictable frequency of injuries sustained in
activities incident to military service and the reasonable foresee-
ability of subsequent negligent medical care, whether occurring
before or after the victim's discharge. Thus, distinguishing between
a continuous tort and a separate post-discharge tort, unnecessary
under the rationale with regard to the actual facts of M.M.H.,
would be equally unnecessary if the negligent medical care oc-
curred in the treatment of an injury sustained in an activity inci-
dent to military service. The suggested rationale, not requiring the
rather elusive, even nebulous distinction between continuous and
independent negligent acts, takes on an additional independent
propriety.
A DIRECTION FOR FEDERAL TORT IMMUNITY AFTER Feres
Given the inconstancy of the Supreme Court in identifying the
rationales for the Feres bar, and the lack of persuasiveness of the
reasons asserted, either the half-dozen in Feres, the three in
Stencel (one of which was not alluded to in Feres), the one in
Shearer (the one not alluded to in Feres), or the three reaffirmed
in Johnson, there would seem to be only three basic alternatives
available to the Court. First, the Court could simply retain the
Feres bar and the three reasons asserted in Johnson. Of course,
there are two serious weaknesses in that alternative: the lack of
persuasiveness of those reasons and the obvious lack of guidance
they afford lower federal courts required to determine the applica-
bility of Feres.
Second, the Court could concede error in interpreting congres-
sional intent and overrule Feres. Were the Court to overrule Feres,
the onus would be cast on Congress to determine whether and to
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what extent it wanted the FTCA to apply to injuries incident to
military service. While, at least theoretically, this might be the
purest method of resolution available, there would be certain prac-
tical problems involved in the procedure. Moreover, for the reasons
noted earlier, overruling Feres seems unlikely to occur in the fore-
seeable future. Even were it to occur, Congress, in attempting to
resolve the issue, would almost certainly consult the Court's opin-
ion in Feres and the Court's reasons for that opinion as stated in
all of the cases from Feres through Johnson. Congress presumably
would recognize the confusion generated among the lower courts
by the various reasons offered by the Supreme Court. Thus, Con-
gress would be confronted with limited alternatives: accepting the
overruling of Feres and subjecting the fisc to predictably enormous
liability; reinstating Feres and the various reasons asserted by the
Court; or reinstating Feres with some of the reasons asserted by
the Court, or none of those reasons. The Court itself has already
tried limiting the reasons from half a dozen to three to one to
three. The results of that approach have not been worthy of con-
gressional emulation. Of course, Congress could reinstate Feres, re-
pudiate the Court's reasons, and fashion a whole new set of reasons
or only one reason. It is even possible that Congress might adopt
the rationale suggested in this article.
Still, there is a certain intuitive sense that, since the Court has
generated the problem with its interpretation of the FTCA in
Feres and its subsequent inconstancy in offering rationales for that
interpretation, perhaps the Court should attempt to ameliorate the
problem. This suggests the third alternative available to the Court.
It could reaffirm its basic conclusion in Feres: "We conclude that
the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service. ' 20 5 The Court could then
offer one rationale for that conclusion: In enacting the FTCA, Con-
gress did not intend to expose the fisc to the predictably enormous
liability arising from injuries sustained in activities incident to mil-
itary service, given the inherently dangerous nature of those activi-
ties. This single rationale has two basic advantages. It would com-
plement the "holding" of Feres quoted above and it would afford
lower federal courts a meaningful guide to follow in determining
when Feres should and should not preclude an FTCA action. The
proposed rationale seems almost to memorialize intellectual con-
205. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
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cepts already perceived by the Court, though not yet verbalized,
and to provide lower courts with a persuasive rationale that would
facilitate decision in future cases. A rationale possessing these
properties would not be half bad.
Feres and THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Perhaps the most illuminating, carefully considered, and persua-
sively supported judicial opinion dealing with the government con-
tractor defense was that in Bynum v. FMC Corp.2 °0 Plaintiff, a
member of the Mississippi National Guard taking part in a seven-
teen-day training mission at Fort Stewart, Georgia, was injured
when the M-548 cargo carrier in which he was riding fell off a
bridge and crashed into the creek below. 207 The plaintiff's injuries
included two broken legs. 28 To recover for his injuries, plaintiff
brought a product liability action against the defendant-manufac-
turer, FMC. 209 Following discovery, the defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment based on the government contractor defense.210
The defendant relied heavily on the statements of Dr. Malcolm
Newman and William H. Stites to support its motion for summary
judgment.2" Dr. Newman attributed the accident to design defects
of the M-548. 12 Stites' affidavit indicated that "the specifications
for the M-548 were the work product of the United States Army
Tank-Automatic Command ("TACOM"), which was responsible
for the designing and testing of wheeled and tracked vehicles pro-
cured by the government for military use.
' 21
3
206. 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985). See notes 219 - 222 for explanation of the govern-
ment contractor defense.




211. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 558.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 559. The district court stated:
According to Stites, TACOM supplied FMC with a technical data package containing
over 2500 sheets of detailed drawings that were to be used in the manufacture of the
M-548. Under the contract .... FMC was obligated to comply strictly with these
design specifications in producing the M-548. If FMC desired to alter any particular
portion of the design, the proposed modification had to be submitted to TACOM for
review and testing. Any unapproved deviation from the government's specifications
would result in rejection of the vehicles by the government's inspectors who, in accor-
dance with the contract, worked full time at the FMC plant.
Finally, Stites stated in his affidavit that the particular vehicle that was involved in
the accident had been manufactured in strict compliance with the government's plans
and specifications. The type of event that Newman described as being the most likely
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The plaintiff did not file an evidentiary response to the motion
for summary judgment.21 The parties'stipulated that, "[tihe vehi-
cle in issue in the present case was manufactured in accordance
with precise design specifications furnished by the United States
Government, the vehicle conformed to the specifications, and the
manufacturer FMC knew of no patent dangers in the vehicle that
were not known to the United States Government." '215 The district
court judge granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, noting that his decision was based on an Erie guess that the
courts in Mississippi courts would probably apply the government
contractor's defense.
216
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on a different basis.2 17 The court
began by reviewing Feres and Stencel.218 It was obvious from the
facts that Bynum would be precluded from maintaining a success-
ful FTCA action by Feres. Indeed, under the rationale this author
suggests for Feres, the claim would fail since the plaintiff's injuries
resulted from an activity incident to military service. Moreover, if
the plaintiff recovered from FMC, FMC would be barred from en-
joying indemnification from the government under Stencel. To
permit such indemnification would be to compensate the victim ul-
timately from the public fisc. Consequently, if the plaintiff were
permitted to recover from FMC in circumstances where FMC
could not secure indemnification from the government, even
though the cause of the plaintiff's injuries existed in the design
specifications created by the government, it would create a poten-
itial unfairness to the government contractor.
The Fifth Circuit considered two common law defenses that had
been made available to government contractors. First, "a contrac-
tor would not be liable for damages resulting from specifications
provided by another unless those specifications were so obviously
defective and dangerous that a contractor of reasonable prudence
would be put on notice that the work was dangerous and likely to
cause injury. "219 The problem with the first defense, the court
cause of the accident, Stites asserted, had never before occurred within the knowledge
of FMC.
Id.
214. Id. at 558.
215. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 559 (citing Bynum v. General Motors Corp., 599 F. Supp.
155, 156 (N.D. Miss. 1984)).
216. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 560.
217. Id. at 560-62.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 563 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt. a (1965)).
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found, was that it might be inappropriate when a product liability
action has been brought utilizing strict liability principles, 2 0 as
was the case in Bynum. The second traditional defense holds the
contractor entitled to the government's sovereign immunity where
the contractor acts as either an agent or an officer of the federal
government. 21 The problem with the second defense is that it
might not apply where the defendant is an independent contrac-
tor,222 as was apparently the case in Bynum.
The problems with these dual common law defenses led the
court to fashion a government contractor defense that would take
into account the interlests of all of the involved parties: the injured
victim, the contractor, and the government. The court saw fit to
limit the government contractor defense to those cases in which
the injured victim would be precluded by Feres from maintaining
an FTCA action against the government. A question remains as to
whether the defense fashioned by the court is fair to the victim.
The Fifth Circuit weighed the government contractor defense it
established against the competing state interests underlying the
imposition of strict liability in a product liability action. One of the
state interests enumerated by the court was to "vindicate the rea-
sonable expectations of the consumer that a product [used by him]
will not be unreasonably dangerous. '223 The court found this state
interest to be inapplicable with regard to the government contrac-
tor for two reasons. First, service personnel "'recognize when they
join the armed forces that they may be exposed to grave risks of
danger'.'224 That reason would take on an a fortiori persuasiveness
under the rationale this author proposed for the Feres bar. The
"grave risks of danger" would exist and be recognized most clearly
when the soldier is engaged in an activity that is incident to mili-
tary service. Second, the court found that, "even if servicemen
have the same expectations of safety as those of ordinary consum-
ers, these expectations would be -directed toward the government,
not the military contractor, when the government is responsible for
the formulation of the design specifications in question and accepts
220. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 563.
221. Id. at 564 (quoting Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21
(1940)).
222. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564.
223. Id. at 572.
224. Id. (quoting McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1843 (1984)).
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the product once it is manufactured. 225
According to the Fifth Circuit court, another state interest un-
derlying product liability was to ensure that the prices of products
reflected the risk of accidents, thereby discouraging the use of such
products.2 26 However, the court rejected the efficacy of this ap-
proach in the area of government contractors.2 2 The court also
noted that "[s]trict liability . . . functions to deter manufacturers
from marketing unreasonably dangerous products."'22 However,
once again the court recognized that this interest would not be
protected in the government contractor context.
2 9
The final rationale for the imposition of strict product liability
identified by the court is compensation for the injured victim. The
Fifth Circuit concluded:
225. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 572.
226. Id. at 571-72. The court stated that products liability served:
[tlo force [producers] to incorporate accident costs into the price of their products.
The theory is that the increased prices will then discourage consumers from purchas-
ing risky products and thereby lower total accident costs to society. Further, imposing
the cost of accidents generally on manufacturers and consumers allows the costs of
product-caused injuries to be spread over a class of users.
Id. at 571.
227. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 572. The court stated that:
In the context of the government contractor defense, however, neither of those goals
would be met. First,. . . the demand for military equipment, unlike consumer goods,
is relatively inelastic .... Meeting adequately the needs of national defense, not
accident costs, is the ultimate standard by which purchases of military equipment
must be measured." Increasing prices of military equipment, therefore, would not
often result in the use of safer substitutes but might pose the risk of a diminished
military capability. Second, the loss-spreading goal of strict liability is built on the
presumption that the manufacturer sells a large volume of products to a large number
of customers. This is simply not the case with respect to military equipment pur-
chased by the government. The effect of strict liability here would be to shift the
entire cost of the accident to the military contractor or, more likely, the government,
thus subverting the Feres-Stencel doctrine.
Id. at 571-72 (quoting in part McKay, 704 F.2d at 452) (citation omitted).
228. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 572.
229. Id. The court stated:
When military equipment is at issue, though, there is a strong government interest in
encouraging the military contractor to agree to manufacture potentially dangerous
products for the government and to comply strictly with government design specifica-
tions. Nor do these policies deprive the user of all protection from unintended design
defects. As is illustrated by the record in this case, the government "has both the
ability to recognize safety problems in military equipment and to negotiate with the
suppliers to remedy those problems." There is thus strong reason to believe, espe-
cially in view of the relatively inelastic demand for military equipment, that requiring
the contractor to test war materials would merely increase defense costs without re-
sulting in significantly safer products.
Id. (quoting in part McKay, 704 F.2d at 452) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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[This] justification . . . does not compel the imposition of strict liability for
defective designs supplied by the government. As the Supreme Court noted
in Stencel, "the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort
liability, a statutory no fault compensation scheme which provides generous
pension to injured servicemen." While strict liability would obviously in-
crease that compensation, to the extent the military contractor has to bear
the cost of the increase, the burden would fall on an innocent defendant."'
Consequently, the court determined that the concerns of the fed-
eral government and the contractor justified overriding the state
interests underlying the imposition of strict product liability.
Moreover, the court determined that federal concerns justified
fashioning the government contractor defense as a part of federal
common law, making the defense applicable whether or not recog-
nized by the state involved.2 '
The government contractor defense fashioned by the court re-
quired that the following three elements be present. First, "the
government [must be] immune from liability under the Feres-
Stencel doctrine. ' 23 2 This federal immunity requirement would as-
sure that "the federal interests in avoiding judicial and state intru-
sion upon military authority are present and warrant the imposi-
tion of federal common law. '23 3 Second, the court concluded that:
[Tihe military contractor must prove that the government established rea-
sonably precise specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment
and that the equipment conformed to those specifications. This element
makes clear that federal law provides no defense to the military contractor
that mismanufactures military equipment or that is itself ultimately respon-
sible for the design defect."3
The third requirement set forth by the court was that the plaintiff
must show that the government was warned about specification er-
rors that the contractor knew about, and that the contractor also
warned the government about dangers involved in the equipment
usage of which the government was not aware.23 5 This third re-
230. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 572 (quoting in part Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671) (citation
omitted).




235. Id. The court was unwilling to impose on the contractor a duty to warn the gov-
ernment of risks of which the contractor had only constructive knowledge, explaining:
Such a duty would compel the military contractor to reevaluate the design specifica-
tions furnished by the government and to engage in testing not required under the
government contract. Such reevaluations and additional testing would mean delay
and an increase in defense costs not contemplated by the military authorities. Fur-
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quirement would assure that the government is able to make de-
sign and use decisions based on all readily available information.
Finding that each of the three noted requirements had been satis-
fied, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
FMC.23
There is an appealing symmetry to the Fifth Circuit's applica-
tion of the government contractor defense. If the plaintiff is pre-
cluded by Feres from recovering from the government, and the
contractor is barred by Stencel from securing indemnification from
the government, there would be an impropriety in imposing liabil-
ity on the contractor for injuries resulting from defective design
specifications created by the government. Moreover, the court's
opinion offers acceptable reasons for sublimating the usual state
interests in imposing strict liability into a higher federal common
law negating such interests. If the previously suggested Feres ra-
tionale were to be added to the court's opinion in Bynum, there
would be a near perfect application of the government contractor
defense.
The Supreme Court considered the government contractor de-
fense in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.25 7 Boyle involved a
United States Marine who drowned after the helicopter he had
been flying crashed into the Atlantic Ocean and he was trapped in
the helicopter. 238 Decedent's father brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against the manufacturer of the helicopter, alleging that the
decedent's death had resulted from the defendant's defective de-
sign of the emergency escape system.2 39 The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff and the federal district court denied defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.240 The Fourth
Circuit reversed, concluding that, the defendant had established
the "military contractor defense."'24  When the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, it set the stage to determine whether to recog-
thermore, . . the military has the ability to recognize safety problems or at least
negotiate with the contractors for further testing, especially with respect to those de-
sign specifications that it generates itself. When to require additional testing of mili-
tary equipment, and at what cost, are decisions that are better left to the military and
the political branches of government.
Bynum, 770 F.2d at 576 (citation omitted).
236. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 578.
237. - 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
238. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
239. Id. at 502-03.




nize the government contractor defense and, if recognized, what
the foundation and requirements for the defense should be.
Boyle was argued before an eight-member Court,2' 2 but the
Court ordered reargument after a ninth Justice joined the Court. 43
Ordering reargument suggests that the Court may have been dead-
locked and required a ninth and deciding vote. Indeed, the Court
ultimately divided 5-4, and the majority opinion was written by
Justice Scalia.144 Since Bynum had found that the government
contractor defense rested on Feres and Stencel, and since Justice
Scalia had authored the dissenting opinion in Johnson concluding
that Feres had been wrongly decided, one might have assumed
that the majority opinion in the reargued case would repudiate the
government contractor defense. One would have been wrong.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, approved the government
contractor defense.2 "5 Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit in
Bynum, the Court fashioned the defense as federal common law.246
The elements the contractor is required to prove in order to assert
the defense successfully were similar to those required by Bynum,
and were identified by the Court as follows: "(1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment con-
formed to those specifications; and, (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.' ' 247 How-
ever, Feres and Stencel were not the foundations upon which the
Court-approved government contractor defense rested. Rather, the
Court concluded that the foundation of the defense was the discre-
tionary function exception to the FTCA.245
How does the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, in-
tended to immunize the government from liability, apply to the
contractor? The Court reasoned that any other decision was eco-
242. Justice Powell had retired and his successor, Justice Kennedy, had not yet been
confirmed.
243. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 484 U.S. 1054 (1988).
244. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
245. Id. at 504.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 512.
248. Id. at 511 (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). Justice Scalia wrote:
We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be
used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of
this provision. It often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to
the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including
specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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nomically illogical. 4 9
Why did the Court feel compelled to supplant the Feres-Stencel
foundation for the government contractor defense with the discre-
tionary function exception to the FTCA, which is generally consid-
ered to immunize the government only? To a cynic, one possible
answer may be that Justice Scalia, whose vote was necessary to
form the five-Justice majority in Boyle, did not like Feres (remem-
ber his dissent in Johnson), but did like the government contractor
defense. For him, the problem was to find some foundation for the
defense other than Feres, and the discretionary function exception
was it. Of course, Justice Scalia's opinion does not reflect this line
of reasoning. Rather, he wrote:
[T]he Feres doctrine, in its application to the present problem, logically
produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some respects
too narrow. Too broad, because if the Government contractor defense is to
prohibit suit against the manufacturer whenever Feres would prevent suit
against the Government, then even injuries caused to military personnel by
a helicopter purchased from stock[,] . . . or by any standard equipment
purchased by the Government, would be covered. Since Feres prohibits all
service-related tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense
that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the
manufacturer-making inexplicable the three [additional] limiting criteria
for contractor immunity.
2 5 0
Again, one might comment, "That can't be right!" Even as fash-
ioned in Bynum, the government contractor defense, although rest-
ing on the Feres-Stencel foundation, required the contractor to
prove the three additional elements. These additional elements are
not simply gratuitous; they demonstrate that the government, not
the contractor, was primarily responsible for the injury-producing
defect. It is in circumstances such as this that it would be inappro-
priate to permit the victim to recover from the nonculpable con-
tractor, even though the victim cannot recover and the contractor
cannot secure indemnification from the culpable government. If
the injury-producing defect were attributable to the contractor and
249. Id. at 511-12. The Court noted:
The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be
passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since defense
contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent
liability for the Government-ordered designs. To put the point differently: It makes
little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment
that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government
produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production.
Id.
250. Id. at 510.
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not to the government, there would be no impropriety in permit-
ting the victim to recover from the contractor, even though the vic-
tim could not recover and the contractor could not secure indemni-
fication from the government. Had the Court recognized the
significance of the three additional elements, similar to those re-
quired by Boyle, it would have been entirely free to adopt the
Bynum formulation without imposing the defense into all cases
covered by Feres. In this manner, the Court could have avoided
the "too broad" results found by Justice Scalia.
Why would the Feres foundation produce results "too narrow"?
Justice Scalia wrote:
[R]eliance on Feres produces (or logically should produce) results that are
in another respect too narrow. Since the doctrine covers only service-related
injuries, and not injuries caused by the military to civilians, it could not be
invoked to prevent, for example, a civilian's suit against the manufacturer
of fighter planes, based on a state tort theory, claiming harm from what is
alleged to be needlessly high levels of noise produced by the jet engines. Yet
we think that the character of the jet engines the Government orders for its
fighter planes cannot be regulated by state tort law, no more in suits by
civilians than in suits by members of the Armed Services.2 1
Justice Scalia poses an artfully framed hypothetical, as it involves
the noisome but not directly and immediately disabling effect of
the sound of jet engines. Consider a hypothetical case suggested by
the dissent.2"2 Had the helicopter crashed on the beach rather than
off the coast, causing the deaths of beachgoers, from whom could
recovery be sought? Assuming that the defect that caused the
crash was the product of design specifications approved by the gov-
ernment and that the three elements identified by the Court ex-
isted, the answer would seem to be no one. The government would
be immune from liability because of the discretionary function ex-
ception to the FTCA. According to Boyle, "the selection of the ap-
propriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed
Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of
this provision. "253
The contractor would be immune from liability because of the
government contractor defense fashioned by Boyle, which is
equally applicable to claims arising out of injuries to service per-
sonnel or civilians. The ameliorating factor noted by the Bynum
court, which predicated the government contractor defense on
251. Id. at 510-11.
252. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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Feres and Stencel, was that the injured soldier or his dependents
would at least receive compensation under the VBA. Under the
government contractor defense fashioned by Boyle, permitting
such a defense in an action arising out of injuries or death of civil-
ian victims from a product defect, the ameliorating factor would be
absent. Not even the defendant in Boyle argued for such a sweep-
ing result. It is ironic that in Johnson, Justice Scalia, author of the
dissenting opinion finding that Feres had been wrongly decided,
stopped short of voting to overrule Feres because the plaintiff had
not requested such a result. Yet in Boyle, Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, fashioned a government contractor defense far
broader than that sought by the defendant. As noted by the dis-
sent, "respondent [contractor] has three times disavowed any reli-
ance on the discretionary function exception, even after coaching
by the Court, as has the Government.
' '25
4
There are several problems inherent in the Court's decision in
Boyle to supplant the Feres-Stencel foundation for the govern-
ment contractor defense with the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA. One of these problems has already been noted.
Boyle's conclusion would leave civilian victims of defective military
products without remedy. This result seems sufficiently draconian
in itself to suggest the impropriety of Boyle. Moreover, in fashion-
ing the federal common law government contractor defense in
Boyle, the Court, although purportedly performing a judicial func-
tion, created a defense more sweeping in application than that
which government contractors had sought unsuccessfully from
Congress. 55 While inaction on the part of Congress may not strip
the Court of its power to decide, it should at least suggest circum-
spection on the part of the Court in determining how to decide. It
is not difficult to imagine the outrage of the electorate had Con-
gress enacted legislation effectively extending immunity from lia-
bility to the government and to government contractors for the in-
jury or death of civilians caused by defective military equipment in
all cases where:
(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
254. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
255. Id. at 516. See, e.g., H.R. 4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (limitations on civil
liability of Government contractors); S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (same). See also
H.R. 2378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (indemnification of civil liability for Government
contractors); H.R. 5883, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (same); H.R. 1564, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.




(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and,
(3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the
use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States.256
The publicity attendant to congressional consideration of such a
bill would trigger an outpouring of adverse reaction from the elec-
torate. Were such a bill enacted into law, the outrage of the electo-
rate the first time a defective military product produced cata-
strophic civilian consequences would almost certainly lead to a
"vote the rascals out" movement and perhaps prompt repeal by
Congress. Since its members enjoy life tenure, the Court is not vul-
nerable to such political reaction. In such circumstances, the im-
munity it enjoys from the electorate should counsel judicial re-
straint, which seems wholly lacking in Boyle.
Another problem with Boyle, one predicted by the dissent and
corroborated by subsequent lower court opinions, is that it is not
at all clear that the government contractor defense fashioned by
the Court was intended to be applicable only to defective military
equipment. This defense could also be deemed applicable to civil-
ian products manufactured for the government, in instances where
the three enumerated requirements are satisfied.257 Any broader
applicability would subject an even greater portion of the civilian
population to the risk of injury or death from defective products
without meaningful legal redress or compensation.
Finally, there is earlier Supreme Court precedent lurking in the
background. In Berkovitz v. United States,58 the Court held that
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA would not shield
the government from liability if the government's conduct was in-
consistent with "a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescrib[ing] a course of action for [a federal] employee to fol-
low."'2 59 What will happen in a future case when the enumerated
requirements of Boyle are satisfied, but the government's approval
of the injury-producing defect is inconsistent with "a federal stat-
ute, regulation, or policy"? The possibility of such an occurrence is
enhanced by lower federal court opinions holding that the govern-
ment contractor defense fashioned by Boyle is applicable not only
to design defects, but to warning defects as well, at least where the
256. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
257. See, e.g., Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
258. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
259. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
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260government controls the warnings. Under Berkovitz, the immu-
nity of the government under the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA would seem to fail. Under Boyle, which makes the
discretionary function exception the foundation of the government
contractor defense, does the latter fail as well? If so, would that
impose unfairly on the contractor who is required to comply with
government dictated design or warning defects, or should the con-
tractor be deemed to have knowledge of all potentially applicable
federal statutes, regulations, and policies, and therefore be said to
have acted at its own peril? Boyle sheds little light on these lurk-
ing issues.
Can the problems enumerated above that are inherent in Boyle
be eliminated? That question can be answered in the affirmative.
The Court could eliminate them in either of two ways. First, the
Court could recant Boyle and its adoption of the government con-
tractor defense. However, retraction of the government contractor
defense seems unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. While
the highly speculative nature of attempting to predict future votes
by members of the Court has already been noted, it may be worth
adding that two of the four dissenters in Boyle have retired from
the Court, while four of the five Justices comprising the majority
in Boyle remain on the Court. Moreover, the majority opinion in
Boyle suggests a strong judicial feeling in favor of a government
contractor defense; so strong that Justice Scalia, author of the
opinion and a critic of Feres, found an alternative basis for the
defense. All of these factors suggest the unlikelihood that the
Court will completely repudiate the government contractor
defense.
The second alternative available to the Court would be to retain
the government contractor defense but recant the discretionary
function foundation, and, following the lead of Bynum, utilize the
Feres-Stencel foundation. This alternative would go a long way to-
wards eliminating the problems inherent in Boyle. With the Feres-
Stencel foundation, the government contractor defense would be
applicable only to those claims arising out of injuries incident to
military service. Given the rationale suggested by this author for
Feres, the government contractor defense bottomed on Feres and
Stencel could be asserted only in those cases in which the victim's
260. See, e.g., Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn.
1988); Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Joint Eastern & Southern
District New York Asbestos Litigation, 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990).
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injury had arisen out of an activity incident to military service and
therefore inherently dangerous. Thus, in every such case the vic-
tims, or their survivors, would be eligible for compensation under
the VBA, assuring that no plaintiff would be wholly without rem-
edy. In addition, using the Feres-Stencel foundation for the gov-
ernment contractor defense would limit the application of the de-
fense to cases involving injuries occurring in activities incident to
military service. The Feres-Stencel rationale would also exclude
the defense in cases involving injuries to civilians. In this manner,
the Court would eliminate any public or congressional concern that
it might have made a determination better left to other branches
of government. Also, use of the Feres-Stencel foundation would
seem to lead to the conclusion that the government contractor de-
fense was not applicable to cases involving defective products in-
tended for non-military purposes. Finally, the Feres-Stencel foun-
dation would negate the potential problems generated by
Berkovitz and its conclusion that the discretionary function excep-
tion to the FTCA is not applicable to government conduct in viola-
tion of federal statute, regulation or policy. Were the discretionary
function exception supplanted by Feres and Stencel as the founda-
tion for the government contractor defense, governmental conduct
violative of federal statute, regulation or policy would have little
potential for subjecting the contractor to liability.
In short, using the Feres-Stencel foundation for the government
contractor defense would afford contractors a meaningful defense
in a significant number of cases (although far fewer than Boyle),
without leaving victims wholly without redress, without impinging
on what might be characterized as a political issue, and without
complicating or negating the defense, as a consequence of
Berkovitz.
How likely is the Court to adopt that modified version of the
government contractor 'defense? In Boyle, Justice Scalia found the
Bynum-like application of the defense "too broad" because it
would preclude successful action against the contractor for injuries
incident to military service, even if the injury were caused by a
product not designed according to government specifications.261 As
has been noted, however, this is not the case. The additional re-
quirements in Bynum, similar to those in Boyle, would limit the
defense to those actions in which the defect was attributable pri-
marily to government fault, and preclude the defense where the
261. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
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defect was primarily attributable to contractor fault. This result is,
after all, the ultimate consequence of the three enumerated re-
quirements in Boyle and Bynum. Further reflection by the Court,
making this conclusion apparent, should ameliorate any significant
concern that the defense would be "too broad." Moreover, if the
author's suggested rationale for Feres were adopted by the Court,
the government contractor defense would be applicable only to
those injuries arising out of an activity truly incident to military
service, diminishing any concern of an overly broad application.
Justice Scalia found that a Bynum-like application of the gov-
ernment contractor defense would be "too narrow" because it
would not extend to civilians injured by the military.262 It is, how-
ever, the broader application that leaves victims without any re-
course, judicial resolution of a political issue, and potential restric-
tion of the defense as a result of Berkovitz. Perhaps further
reflection by the Court would lead it to conclude that a broader
application is simply inappropriate.
If the Court were to rethink and conclude that the Bynum
method of fashioning and applying the government contractor de-
fense was neither too broad nor too narrow, but rather a fairly
well-balanced resolution of conflicting concerns, there would seem
to remain only one obstacle to the Court's refashioning the de-
fense: Justice Scalia's aversion to Feres. Yet, that aversion was not
so strong that he felt compelled to vote for overruling Feres, unin-
vited, in Johnson. Given the proposed rationale for Feres, the in-
constancy manifested by the Court when it identified the reasons
underlying its decision, and the irrational results generated by that
inconstancy, would largely be eliminated. In addition, it is interest-
ing to note that of the three other members of the Court who
joined in Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson,263 all of whom were
still members when Boyle was decided, none joined in Justice
Scalia's opinion for the Court in Boyle; all dissented.26" To the ex-
tent that an aversion to Feres contributed to supplanting the
Feres-Stencel foundation with the discretionary function founda-
tion in Boyle, it apparently did so only with regard to Justice
Scalia. Presumably, the other members of the Court comprising
the majority in Boyle would not find it intolerable to consider
utilizing the Feres-Stencel foundation for the government contrac-
262. Id.
263. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692.




RESOLVING THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE UNDER Feres
The Court has three basic paths to follow with regard to the gov-
ernment contractor defense. First, it may simply continue to apply
Boyle. The weaknesses inherent in that course of action have al-
ready been enumerated. The "too broad" concern simply is not
factually well-based. The "too narrow" concern subjects civilian
victims to injuries without recourse, resolves an apparently politi-
cal issue, and invites Berkovitz complications. Second, the Court
could repudiate the government contractor defense entirely. As
previously noted, this course of action seems highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future. Finally, the Court could retain the government
contractor defense, utilizing Feres and Stencel as its foundation,
rather than the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
Pursuing this third course would preserve a significant defense for
government contractors and, presumably, result in significant sav-
ings to the government. It would simultaneously assure that the
injured victims would recover some compensation under the VBA.
It would achieve the desirable symmetry accomplished by Bynum
and, in the process, afford Supreme Court approval to intellectual
concepts already memorialized in Bynum. It would also provide
lower courts with a persuasive rationale unlikely to be complicated
by concerns about non-military products and government conduct
that might violate federal statute, regulation or policy. That would
not be bad, either.
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